We consider the problem of aggregation of incomplete preferences represented by arbitrary binary relations or incomplete paired comparison matrices. For a number of indirect scoring procedures we examine whether or not they satisfy the axiom of self-consistent monotonicity. The class of win-loss combining scoring procedures is introduced which contains a majority of known scoring procedures. Two main results are established. According to the first one, every win-loss combining scoring procedure breaks self-consistent monotonicity. The second result provides a sufficient condition of satisfying self-consistent monotonicity.
Introduction
A good method of preference fusion when there are only two alternatives is the simple majority of judge votes. This has been shown by Condorcet in his famous jury theorem [1] ; for a review of further developments see [2, 3] .
The situation becomes much more complicated when the number of alternatives exceeds two. In this case, the majority of judge preferences may turn out to be intransitive and contain preference cycles. Some statistical approaches to this problem are developed in the theory of paired comparisons (see [4] ) and ranking data (see [5] ).
In this paper, we use a normative approach typical of the social choice theory and consider indirect scoring procedures as the methods of preference fusion. These ingenious procedures are mainly developed in such disciplines as applied statistics, scoring of sport tournaments, graph theory, management science, etc. Indirect score of an alternative reflects not only the outcomes of its comparisons with other alternatives, but also the comparison outcomes of those alternatives to which this one has been compared, and this way it may depend on all the available preference data. Still there are very few papers on indirect scoring procedures in the social choice theory. Probably, the reason is that these procedures are not arithmetically ascetic enough, and thereby, according to a widespread opinion, do not correspond to the non-quantitative nature of the social choice problem. Another problem is that they are not easy to describe to the individuals involved in the choice process. However, complexity may be considered to be an advantage in the context of the strategic behavior: complicated procedures are more difficult to manipulate.
Nevertheless, there is a case where the indirect scoring procedures are really needed, namely, the case of incomplete preferences. In this paper, we attempt to demonstrate this case, give a brief critical review of indirect scoring procedures, and compare their properties.
Let us consider the situation where an individual is given a set of alternatives to be compared, but he/she is not an expert in all of them. Suppose she is allowed to compare only those alternatives she is familiar with; moreover, to report only those comparison outcomes she is certain of. In fact, we consider even more general types of individual opinions, namely, each of them is an arbitrary binary relation. To prepare these data for calculating indirect scores, we represent them by incomplete matrices of paired comparisons borrowed from the statistical theory of paired comparisons.
The main aim of this paper is to examine whether or not the indirect scoring procedures satisfy the axiom of Self-Consistent Monotonicity (SCM). It has been introduced in [6] where we used it to explore a series of preference aggregation procedures based on the resolution of discrete optimization problems.
Up to now there has not been a comprehensive review of indirect scoring procedures. However, a lot of information can be found in monographs [4, [7] [8] [9] [10] and papers [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] . For relations to the social choice framework see [17] . An adjacent subject is the analysis of tournament social choice rules (see, e.g., [18, 19] ).
The paper is organized as follows. After the following section which provides main notation, in Section 3 we give an example demonstrating the specific character of aggregating incomplete preferences. Section 4 contains the statement and justification of SCM. Section 5 demonstrates that if a procedure is based on individual scores, it break SCM. Sections 6, 8 and 10 give a review of indirect scoring procedures known from the literature. Section 7 introduces the class of win-loss combining scoring procedures and establishes that these procedures fail to satisfy SCM. Section 9 provides a sufficient condition for SCM, and Section 11 discusses two other axioms.
Notation
Suppose J = {1, . . . , n} is a set of alternatives to be compared. There are m individuals (judges, voters, etc.), and each of them reports his/her preferences. Concerning any pair (i, j) of alternatives, an individual may give one of the following four responses: (a) "i is better than j", (b) "j is better than i", (c) "i and j are equivalent", and (d) "I do not report my opinion on this pair." Using the responses of the pth individual, an incomplete paired comparison matrix This way we have an array of incomplete paired comparison matrices A = (A (1) , . . . , A (m) ) which is referred to as a profile of individual preferences. A scoring (rating) procedure is a function S from the set of all profiles (or its subset) into R n , where s i , the ith component of the resulting column vector s = (s 1 , . . . , s n )
⊤ is interpreted as a score of the alternative i. All the scoring procedures considered in this paper are assumed to be neutral (any reindexing of the alternatives preserves their scores) and anonymous (any reindexing of the individuals preserves the scores of the alternatives). The term "aggregation of incomplete preferences" will mean here nothing but rating the alternatives by the scores s 1 , . . . , s n : the greater is a score, the more socially preferred is the alternative.
An Example
The problem of aggregation of incomplete preferences has a specific flavor which cannot be revealed in dealing with complete preferences. To capture it consider the following example. Suppose there are four alternatives, J = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and nine individuals (judges). Three judges are familiar with alternatives 1 and 2 and they all feel that 1 is better ( Fig. 1 .a where an arrow from 1 to 2 shows that 1 is preferred to 2). Three judges think that 1 and 3 are equivalent ( Fig. 1 .b where line segments without arrows designate equivalencies). Finally, three judges are familiar with 2 and 4, and they all consider these alternatives of equal quality ( Fig. 1.c) . The preferences of these nine individuals are incorporated in Fig. 1 .d. Can we say anything about the comparative quality of 3 and 4? Although no judge is familiar with 3 and 4 simultaneously, it is plausible that 3 is better than 4. Note that 3 and 4 have the same comparison outcomes: three equivalencies; they differ only in the alternatives to which they were compared. The "opponent" of 3 is probably better than that of 4 and due to this 3 may be estimated higher than 4.
Thus, in aggregating incomplete preferences we should take into account "quality (strength) of the opponents" or "caliber of the opposition" or "schedule difficulty". These terms came from sport, and we see that there is a similarity between the problem of aggregation of incomplete preferences and the problem of rating the participants of an incomplete tournament (note that the extent of this similarity is a distinct and interesting question). Moreover, in the following section this sport analogy will be exploited to explain the meaning of Self-Consistent Monotonicity, the axiom which is discussed throughout the paper. Sometimes the comparison outcome where i is preferred to j will be called a "win" of i and a "loss" of j.
Self-Consistent Monotonicity
First, let us consider one more example. Suppose we have the incomplete sport tournament whose fragment containing all game results of i and j is shown in Fig. 2 . Suppose we know that a is stronger than b, c is stronger than d, and e is stronger than f . Then the results of i are definitely better than those of j. Indeed, a loss to a is more pardonable than that to b, a win over c is more honorable than that over d, and a win over e is more valuable than a draw with f . Besides, i has three extra wins and j has two extra losses, which intensify the advantage of i over j. In fact, the following self-consistent monotonicity axiom requires that in such situations the score of i should be greater than the score of j. The only point is the meaning of preconceptions like "we know that a is stronger than b". Selfconsistent monotonicity applies to scoring procedures, and here "we know that a is stronger than b" signifies "this scoring procedure gives a a greater score than b." This makes clear why this kind of monotonicity is called "selfconsistent".
In the following statement of self-consistent monotonicity, we use the term "multiset". Its difference from set is that multiset may contain the same element in several copies. This concept is needed here since the outcomes of comparisons with different alternatives may coincide. The elements of multisets will be written within angle brackets.
Self-consistent monotonicity (SCM).
A scoring procedure S is SelfConsistently Monotonic if for any set of alternatives J, any profile A , and any alternatives i, j ∈ J it satisfies the following condition. The application of SCM to a pair of alternatives (i, j) will be called confrontation of i and j.
It turns out that many well-known indirect scoring procedures fail to satisfy self-consistent monotonicity. In the following two sections we try to explore the features of these procedures that cause them not to satisfy SCM. The results are presented in Proposition 1 (Section 5) and Theorem 8 (Section 7). Section 9 provides a sufficient condition of SCM (Theorem 12).
Procedures Based on Individual Scores
A scoring procedure S is based on individual scores if there exist functions f and δ such that for any profile A = (A (1) , . . . , A (m) ), the corresponding score vector s can be expressed as s = δ(s (1) , . . . , s (m) ), where s (p) is a partial score vector depending solely on the comparison matrix of individual p:
The most important instance is
forming (in case of complete preferences) a class of procedures which satisfy the recent axiomatics by Myerson [20] .
Proposition 1 There are scoring procedures based on individual scores that satisfy SCM on complete preferences but no such procedure satisfies SCM for incomplete preferences.
PROOF. To prove the first statement, it suffices to consider the row sum procedure, which in case of complete preferences has the form
This procedure obviously satisfies SCM.
The second statement can be proved by considering our first example of Fig. 1 . Let p = 1, 2, 3 be the numbers of individuals in Fig. 1 .a, p = 4, 5, 6 in Fig. 1 .b, and p = 7, 8, 9 in Fig. 1 .c. By neutrality and anonymity of S ,
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Confronting 3 and 4 by SCM (see Fig. 1 .d), we deduce s 1 = s 2 . But now, confronting 1 and 2, we get contradiction. 2
In words, these procedures generally break SCM because the result of confrontation between two alternatives may be only determined by the preferences of the whole board of judges.
Aggregate Scoring Procedures
Hereafter we will consider scoring procedures that cannot be reduced to individual scores. Such indivisible procedures can be called aggregate. A large variety of them are representable through the matrix A = [a ij ] of total comparison outcomes on the pairs of alternatives:
Consider the scores of the form:
where x j (j = 1, . . . , n) is some estimate of the alternative j, f is a function nondecreasing in both a ij and x j . Sometimes averaged scores of the form
are proposed, where m i is the total number of comparisons of i (see, e.g., [16] ). For simplicity, we do not consider this modification here, however, it is covered by Theorem 8 below.
Wei's Procedure
The most popular form of f in Eqs (2) is the product:
Regarding the choice of the form of x j , perhaps the most attractive idea is to relate x j and s j directly. However, if we set x j = s j , j = 1, . . . , n, the homogeneous system of linear equations (4) may have only a trivial solution s 1 = · · · = s n = 0. A minor modification is to define x j to be proportional to s j :
not specifying λ a priori. Then
or in the matrix form,
thus λ is an eigenvalue and s an eigenvector of A.
This scoring procedure was proposed by Wei [21] and became well-known after Kendall's [22] paper. Matrix A generally has several eigenvalues, each having its own subspace of eigenvectors. Only one solution is taken, and this solution possesses special properties. Let us suppose that the preferences are indivisible, i.e., the set of alternatives J cannot be split into two nonempty parts J 1 and J 2 such that for no alternatives j ∈ J 2 and i ∈ J 1 , a ji > 0. Then, by the Perron-Frobenius theorem, the largest in absolute value eigenvalue of A is positive, the corresponding subspace of eigenvectors is one-dimensional, and these eigenvectors have the same sign of all terms. Just the normalized positive eigenvector s of this type is taken as a vector of scores in the Wei procedure (which applies to indivisible preferences).
Wei's eigenvector can be obtained iteratively. Consider the following sequence of score vectors:
It follows from the Perron-Frobenius theorem that in case of indivisible profiles, the normalized sequence (s k ) converges to Wei's score vector:
It is a simple fact that s k i is the number of k-length paths from i to all vertices in the preference multidigraph. Thus, in Wei's procedure, alternatives are compared by the number of very long ("infinitely-long") paths diverging from them in the preference multidigraph. In Subsection 6.3 we shall consider a scoring procedure where longer paths are accounted with smaller weights.
Proposition 2 If indivisible preferences are complete, Wei's scoring procedure satisfies SCM, but it breaks SCM for incomplete indivisible preferences.
PROOF. To prove the first statement, confront arbitrary i and j by SCM:
and assume that some partitions of U i and U j described in self-consistent monotonicity exist. Then U The comparison outcomes of alternative 5 are equivalencies with alternatives 1, 2, 3 and 4. Alternative 5 is introduced only to make the preferences indivisible. Consider the equations with s 2 and s 3 on the left-hand sides:
Hence, s 2 = s 3 , which contradicts SCM, since 3 has an extra "loss" (a 31 = 0, a 13 = 1). 2
The example used in the proof of Proposition 2 reveals one important feature of Wei's procedure as applied to incomplete preferences. Namely, this procedure bases itself only on "wins" and does not take into account "losses". More precisely, it does not distinguish "losses" from missing comparisons (and precisely this contradicts SCM). A possible way to make the procedure more balanced is to also consider a dual procedure which is based on "losses", and then to combine the resulting scores. This has been done by Hasse [23] and Ramanujacharyulu [24] .
The Procedures by Hasse and Ramanujacharyulu
Let w and l denote the right and left eigenvectors of matrix A, corresponding to its maximal eigenvalue λ :
Here w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ) is the vector of Wei's win-scores, which is not sensitive to the distinction between "losses" and missing comparisons; l = (ℓ 1 , . . . , ℓ n ) is the vector of loss-scores, which does not distinguish "wins" and missing comparisons. The matrix form of Eqs (11) is
where B = A ⊤ is the transpose of A.
Hasse [23] proposed to combine w and l into the ultimate scores:
Another procedure proposed by Ramanujacharyulu [24] has scores given by:
These two procedures are close but may produce different rankings, since the first one registers the absolute differences between win-scores and loss-scores, whereas the second is based on the relative differences. Both procedures are applicable to indivisible preferences and turn out to break self-consistent monotonicity. We do not formulate the corresponding statement, because there are many possible modifications of such procedures, and a more reasonable thing to do is to isolate their common features and then to prove a more general theorem. To this end, in the following two subsections we consider two other families of indirect scoring procedures, and then proceed with a theorem.
The Procedure of Katz-Thompson-Taylor
As we have seen, Wei's scores rank order the alternatives according to the number of very long paths diverging from them in the preference multidigraph. Katz [25] and then Thompson [26] and Taylor [27] proposed a scoring procedure in which the long paths play just a correcting role, whereas the short paths are taken into account with greater weights. Namely, Thompson introduced the scores of the form
where ε is a small positive parameter. If ε < r −1 where r is the spectral radius of A, then the series (15) , which in fact is a geometric progression, converges and
where I is the identity matrix.
Thompson shows that his normalized vector w tends to Wei's eigenvector as ε approaches r −1 from below. Besides, he gives a game-theoretical interpretation of these scores comparable with the approach by Laffond, Laslier and Lebreton [28] .
The paper by Taylor is one of the few social choice articles devoted to indirect scoring procedures. He investigated sequential voting by the committee and considered Hamiltonian sequences of winning alternatives, which led him to a scoring procedure very close to (15) . In fact, Taylor used another matrix C = [c ij ] instead A, where
Since for the preference structure we use in the proof of Theorem 8 in Section 7, A and C coincide, the statement of this theorem is valid for Taylor's procedure.
As above, w in Eqs (15) and (16) is a vector of win-scores, and it is worth being supplemented by the corresponding loss-scores. So we may consider a pair of vectors (w, l ) where
and combine w and l as in the procedures of Hasse and Ramanujacharyulu:
The question we are interested in is whether or not these procedures satisfy self-consistent monotonicity. The answer is negative. After considering one more family of scoring procedures, we give a theorem that will clarify this point to some extent.
Directed Tree Procedure by Daniels-Ushakov-Goddard-Levchenkov
Let c + i and c − i be the total "win" and total "loss" of i, respectively:
Daniels [11] and other writers [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] proposed, with various motivations, the scores w 1 , . . . , w n that satisfy
The only difference of this system of equation from that of Wei is that λ is replaced by c Also, in [37] [38] [39] this procedure is analyzed in the social choice framework, and in [40, 41] its strategic properties are touched upon.
Exactly as before, we may consider the corresponding loss-scores mentioned by Daley [35] :
and define the ultimate score vector as a combination of w and l , e.g.,
. . , n. The procedures of this family break SCM, and now we are in a position to specify a more general class of indirect scoring procedures that do not obey SCM. All the above procedures are included.
A General Class of Procedures That Fail to Satisfy Self-Consistent Monotonicity
In this section we define win-loss indices and win-loss combining procedures and prove that such procedures break self-consistent monotonicity.
In the following Definitions 3-5, profile A is fixed; "vector" means ncomponent column vector.
Definition 3 (recursive). Win-loss index of finite order.
• . A pair of vectors (w, l ) is a win-loss index of order k if there exists a win-loss index (w ′ , l ′ ) of order k − 1 and functions f , g, α and β such that
where
. . , n; angle brackets designate multisets. One can see that in the Directed tree procedure of Subsection 6.4, α(c
; f and g are sums of products. An essential difference is that in the Directed tree procedure, w i and ℓ i are related with the win-performance and loss-performance corresponding to the same pair of vectors (w, l ), not to a win-loss index of the previous order. Thus, Eqs (19) and (20) do not fit Definition 3. That pair of vectors (w, l ) satisfies the following definition.
Definition 4 Win-loss index of infinite order. A pair of vectors
is a win-loss index of infinite order if there exist functions f , g, α and β such that
The following definition introduces win-loss indices without order.
Definition 5 Win-loss index. A pair of vectors
is a win-loss index if there exists a sequence ((w 1 , ℓ 1 ), (w 2 , ℓ 2 ), ...) of win-loss indices of finite or infinite order and functions ϕ and ψ such that for i = 1, . . . , n,
The components of w and l are referred to as win-scores and loss-scores, respectively (note that they depend on both w-components and ℓ-components of the sequence elements). The next (and last) definition introduces a scoring procedure that combines win-scores and loss-scores of a win-loss index.
Definition 6 Win-loss combining scoring procedure. Scoring procedure S is a win-loss combining scoring procedure if for any profile A there exists a winloss index (w, l ) and a function h such that
Proposition 7 All scoring procedures that generate score vectors of Section 6 or any their iterative approximations constructed as in 2 • of Definition 3, are win-loss combining scoring procedures.
The proof of Proposition 7 is straightforward. Among other win-loss combining scoring procedures, let us mention the elaborate procedure by David (see [42, 4, 15] , and procedures by Cowden [43] and Ginovker [44] . The latter two authors also proposed other procedures which will be mentioned below. An interesting discussion of related topics can be found in [16] .
Theorem 8 Every win-loss combining scoring procedure defined on the set of indivisible preference profiles breaks self-consistent monotonicity.
PROOF. Assume that there exists a win-loss combining scoring procedure that satisfies SCM on the set of indivisible preference profiles. Suppose that (w, l ) is its win-loss index for the profile with the preference digraph shown in Fig. 4 and that s i = h(w i , ℓ i ), i = 1, . . . , n.
Lemma 9
In the above assumptions, (i) ℓ 2 = ℓ 3 ; (ii) w 2 = w 3 .
Proof of Lemma 9. First, assume that (w, l ) is a win-loss index of kth order. If k = 0, (i) and (ii) of Lemma 9 hold. Note also that w 6 = w 7 . If k > 0, there exists a win-loss index (w ′ , l ′ ) of (k − 1)th order and functions f , g, α and β such that Eqs (21) hold for i = 1, . . . , 7. In particular,
In the latter formula we interchanged the two last elements of the multiset W ′ 3 . As we have seen above, for every win-loss index of finite order, w 6 = w 7 , hence w
For win-loss indices of infinite order, (i) and (ii) are proved similarly.
Suppose now that (w, l ) is an arbitrary win-loss index. Then there exists a sequence of win-loss indices of finite or infinite order ((w 1 , ℓ 1 ), (w 2 , ℓ 2 ), . . .) and functions ϕ and ψ such that
Since for every t = 1, 2, . . ., ℓ Since s 2 = h(w 2 , ℓ 2 ) and s 3 = h(w 3 , ℓ 3 ), Lemma 9 implies s 2 = s 3 .
Let us contrast alternatives 2 and 3 by self-consistent monotonicity. It follows that if either s 6 > s 7 or s 7 > s 6 , then s 2 = s 3 is impossible. Hence, s 6 = s 7 . Now, contrasting alternatives 4 and 5, we get s 4 > s 5 .
Finally, contrasting 6 and 7 and using the proved statements s 2 = s 3 and s 4 > s 5 we get s 6 > s 7 , which contradicts s 6 = s 7 obtained above. Thus, our assumption is wrong, and self-consistent monotonicity is broken. 2 Theorem 8 can be explained as follows. All functions in Definitions 3-6 are arbitrary, we impose no constraints on them. The only non-arbitrariness was that "wins" and "losses" were treated separately (whereas "draws" influenced both win-scores and loss-scores). This separation was not complete, because the expressions (21) and (22) for win-scores w i also contained the total losses c − i and vice versa; such a cross-dependence extended to win-indices and lossindices (23) too. In spite of that, as can be shown, a win of alternative j over alternative k can affect the win-score of i = k only if there exists a directed path in the preference multidigraph from i to j or from i to k. Similarly, this win of j over k can affect the loss-score of i = j only if there exists a directed path from j or from k to i. Therefore the ultimate scores are sensitive only to directed paths of these two kinds. As can be concluded from the proof of Theorem 8, self-consistent monotonicity implies the sensitivity of the ultimate scores to the influences that spread not only through directed paths, but also via paths with altering directions of arrows.
Win-Loss Unifying Procedures
In this section we consider two scoring procedures that do not separate wins and losses in the score equations, treating them uniformly. Another important difference from the procedures of Section 6 is that here the function combining the comparison outcomes and the estimates of the opponents (function f in Eqs (2)) has an additive (instead of productive) form. It is worth noting that if the score of i is represented through multiplicative terms such as a ij s j , then the influence of s j upon the score of i depends on a ij : the greater a ij , the stronger this influence. In the extreme case where a ij = 0, s j is not taken into account at all. An additive form of scores, on the contrary, causes a uniform influence of s j upon s i , regardless of a ij . This appears more reasonable.
The Least-Squares Procedure
This procedure, first proposed by Smith [45] and Gulliksen [46] and then investigated in [47-52, etc.] , constructs a mean square approximation of the comparison outcomes by the differences between the desired scores:
is a skew-symmetric modification of the comparison outcomes; r p ij are undefined whenever a p ij and a p ji are undefined; the sum extends over those i, j and p for which r p ij is definite.
Partial differentiation reduces the problem (24) to the system of linear equations
is the number of comparisons of i.
Note some parallelism of this system of equations and that of (19) . A multiplicative counterpart of Eqs (26) is considered in [16] and fits (3).
This procedure is applicable not only to indivisible preference profiles, but to all profiles with connected preference multigraph. Under this condition, the rank of the system (26) is n − 1, and scores s 1 , . . . , s n can be found up to an additive constant. For the complete preferences, this procedure reduces to that of row sums, and it is rather well-performing for incomplete numerical (weighted) preferences. However, in the case of discrete incomplete preferences which we consider here, it can produce some unnatural results (see the proof of the following proposition).
Proposition 10 The Least squares procedure breaks self-consistent monotonicity.
PROOF. Consider the preference multidigraph shown in Fig. 5 .
The least-squares score of 2 is greater than that of 1, in spite of that 1 has an extra win. This breaks self-consistent monotonicity. 2 This proof can be commented as follows. The Least-squares procedure better fits numerical preferences; it punishes 1 for the win over 4 because it "expects" that if 1 beats 3 and 3 beats 4 with the same "intensity", 1 should beat 4 with a greater intensity. The following procedure eliminates this flaw.
The Generalized Row Sum Procedure
This procedure [53, 54] can be considered as a Bayesian modification of the previous one. It is derived axiomatically and has Markov chain and graph theoretic interpretations [55, 56] . The scores satisfy the system of equations
where ε is a positive parameter, ε ≤ (m(n − 2)) −1 , and γ = mn + ε −1 .
Proposition 11
The Generalized row sum procedure satisfies Self-Consistent Monotonicity.
The proof is given in [6] . The form of these scores suggests what kind of procedures satisfies self-consistent monotonicity. A class of such procedures is described in the following section.
A Sufficient Condition of Self-Consistent Monotonicity
Theorem 12 Suppose that a scoring procedure S is such that there exists a function f defined on finite nonempty multisets of real triples and possessing of the following properties.
(ii) f is -increasing in every a
Then scoring procedure S satisfies self-consistent monotonicity.
PROOF. Assume that the relation between i and j described in the statement of self-consistent monotonicity holds, but s i < s j (respectively, s i ≤ s j in the strict case). Then, by (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 12, the left-hand side of the ith equation in the system (28) exceeds the left-hand side of the jth equation, and hence they both cannot be equal to zero. This contradiction proves the theorem. 2
In [57] a modification of SCM is proposed which is met by those and only those scoring procedures that have the implicit form (i)-(ii) of Theorem 12.
10 Four Procedures Satisfying SCM Table 1 lists four procedures that satisfy self-consistent monotonicity. 
Generalized row sum procedure [54] U ε j,p The second column conveys the set of preference profiles to which the corresponding procedure is applicable. Of the four methods, the Generalized row sum procedure is based on the solution of a linear system of equations, three others are reduced to nonlinear systems of equations, which are usually solved with iterative algorithms.
A question arises of how to compare further the procedures that satisfy selfconsistent monotonicity. The last section contains two remarks on the possible additional axioms.
Concluding Remarks
In a follow-up paper we will continue the axiomatic testing of indirect scoring procedures and turn to their axiomatic derivation. We now give two possible conditions which can supplement self-consistent monotonicity.
Macrovertex Independence
The main idea of self-consistent monotonicity is sensitivity of the aggregating procedure. However, there exists an independence condition called Macrovertex independence that does not contradict SCM and seems rather natural (cf. the discussion after Theorem 8).
A subset M of the set of alternatives J is called a macrovertex of the preference multigraph if for every i, j ∈ M and every k ∈ J \ M, n ij = n jk , where n ik is the number of comparisons between i and k in A .
Macrovertex independence. The comparison outcomes of the alternatives within a macrovertex have no influence on the scores of the alternatives outside the macrovertex.
Splitting Balance
Let us note that self-consistent monotonicity is not a very restrictive condition, since it leaves room for some preconception.
To conclude with what we started, we address our first example again and give it a sport interpretation. Suppose that Fig. 1 .d depicts an incomplete chess tournament. Assume that 4 is the world chess champion, 1, 2 and 3 being university students. Our aim is to estimate the strength of the players taking into account prior information.
Most probably, the world champion is the strongest player, and we should allot the highest rank to 4. Player 2 managed to make three draws with the champion. That is great, and we rank 2 second in spite of three his/her losses to 1. Then 1 is the third and 3 the last. Note that this rank order does not contradict SCM! This is what we meant by saying that SCM leaves room for some preconception. There exists a logic (a bit biased) that justifies ranking (4, 2, 1, 3). To avoid this, the following condition may be added.
Splitting Balance. Suppose the set of alternatives J can be split into J 1 and J 2 such that for no i ∈ J 1 and j ∈ J 2 , a ji > 0. Then there exist i ∈ J 1 and j ∈ J 2 such that s i ≥ s j .
The objective of this paper was to put together various indirect scoring procedures (mainly, of infinite order) and to subject them to the analysis in the spirit of the social choice theory. We considered the case of incomplete preferences and an axiom we referred to as self-consistent monotonicity. It was established that many of the known indirect scoring procedures are win-loss combining procedures and, by Theorem 8 of Section 7, they break self-consistent monotonicity. In our opinion, some of them are applicable in the analysis of social networks, since here self-consistent monotonicity is not so attractive as in preference aggregation (cf. [25, 60, 61] ). For instance, the popularity index of an individual should not strongly depend on his/her own responses.
In Theorem 12 we proposed a sufficient condition for self-consistent monotonicity and then listed four procedures that satisfy it. The analysis of indirect scoring procedures started in this paper is intended to be continued with additional axioms (two possible conditions were mentioned in this section), and with the end goal of axiomatic construction of such procedures.
